I test and find supporting evidence for the precautionary motive hypothesis of liquidity hoarding for U.S. commercial banks during the recent financial crisis. I find that banks held more liquid assets in anticipation of future losses from securities write-downs. Exposure to securities losses in their investment portfolios and expected loan losses (measured by loan loss reserves) represent key measures of banks' on-balance sheet risks, in addition to off-balance sheet liquidity risk stemming from unused loan commitments. Furthermore, unrealized securities losses and loan loss reserves seem to better capture the risks stemming from banks' asset management and provide supporting evidence for the precautionary nature of liquidity hoarding. Moreover, I find that more than one-fourth of the reduction in bank lending during the crisis is due to the precautionary motive.
Introduction
At the onset of the financial crisis in the summer of 2007, short-term funding markets experienced a severe disruption: securitization markets-in particular the market for asset-backed commercial paper-collapsed and interbank markets froze (Strahan, 2008; Brunnermeier, 2009) This paper studies the main determinants of bank liquidity hoarding and its effects on bank lending during the recent financial crisis. I propose a measure of liquidity risk-unrealized losses on securities holdings-that accounts for the severe exposure of banks to potential capital losses at the peak of the run in the repo market and that describes the precautionary motive for hoarding liquid asset s. Unrealized losses in securities holdings represent the write-downs of securities (a large portion of which are used as collateral in repo transactions) that result from mark-to-market accounting of investment portfolios. In other words, they reflect the exposure to future capital losses for banks if they had to sell those assets at fire sale prices. This source of liquidity risk has not been explored at length in the literature, due perhaps to the lack of reliable data on repo market transactions and the few balance sheet items related to credit exposure covered by collateral in those transactions.
Liquidity management decisions are not uniform across banks, as they depend on the nature 1 of the risks being faced. I document how liquidity hoarding became manifest at the onset and during the peak of the crisis by examining the behavior of various assets commonly included in the definition of liquid assets. Depending on the type of funding pressures they faced, I find that banks sold assets worth selling, such as treasuries and government securities, because the return on those assets was almost zero. Banks accumulated cash and excess reserves at the central bank because of the interest earned on reserve balances. Banks also accumulated securities such as mortgage-backed securities (MBS) issued or guaranteed by Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. These securities had a positive return due to an implicit government guarantee and provided valuation gains that partly compensated for the losses generated by subprime mortgage-related securities.
Previous work finds that a measure of off-balance sheet liquidity risk for commercial banks, such as the fraction of unused loan commitments to their lending capacity, is a key determinant of bank liquidy management. In particular, Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, and Tehranian (2011), emphasize that large undrawn loan commitments expose banks to sudden liqudity demand from corporations.
That risk materialized during the financial crisis, as firms in need of liquidity rushed to draw down funds from their committed credit lines and forced banks to build up liquidity buffers to meet such increased demand. These drawdowns displaced banks' lending capacity and constrained their new credit origination. Despite the significance of this result, I argue that an important part of the story during the recent financial crisis is still missing.
I extend the work of Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, and Tehranian (2011) in four ways. First, I show that during the financial crisis banks increased their holdings of liquid assets also in anticipation of future losses from securities write-downs (measured by unrealized securities losses) and expected loan losses (measured by loan loss reserves). Furthermore, unrealized securities losses and loan loss reserves seem to better capture the risks stemming from banks' asset management and provide supporting evidence for the precautionary nature of liquidity hoarding. Second, as noted above, I study the heterogeneity across different categories of liquid assets. Since asset categories are moving in opposite directions, each must be examined in tandem to understand the nature of liquidity hoarding. Third, my results also indicate that liquidity hoarding occurred across all 2 banking institutions regardless of their size. I show that the drawdown of unused commitments occured at the time when banks-in particular the larger ones-were hit by large securities and loan losses. This result suggests that corporations rushed to their banks to draw their credit lines concerned about the liquidity and solvency of the banking sector, as pointed out by Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) . Lastly, I examine the behavior of very large banks (with total assets above $50 billion) during the financial crisis. I show that, in addition to liquidity risk from loan commitments and securities losses, these banks were exposed to the l iquidity risk emanating from drawdowns of liquidity backup lines to their conduits used in loan securitizations.
Bank liquidity hoarding is not a new phenomenon. For example, in the aftermath of the Great Depression, and particularly during the late 1930s, U.S. commercial banks accumulated substantial amounts of voluntary excess reserves. As Ramos (1996) points out, during and immediately after a severe liquidity crisis, banks hoard excess cash to self-insure against further drains of cash and to send markets a strong message that their solvency is not at risk and that bank runs are not justifiable. 1 The situation during the banking crisis of the 1930s clearly resembles the bank behavior during the most recent financial crisis. As suggested at that time, banks sought to build up liquidity buffers to reduce their risk exposure on the asset side of their balance sheets at times when capital and debt was very expensive.
As previous work suggests, in managing their liquidity, banks take into account the stability of their funding sources such as equity capital and deposits. 2 My findings indicate that bank capital and deposits are important for both large and small banks, though they seem to be more relevant for small banks. This result is consistent with the view that core deposits are a more important source of funding for smaller banks, given that small banks generally have more restricted access to interbank markets and the central bank's discount window. Core deposits represented an important funding source to increase the holdings of government securities and MBS of small banks.
1 During the 1930s banks were required to increase the level of reserves as a fraction of their deposits. The argument in Ramos (1996) is that banks responded by accumulating large amounts of voluntary reserves, that is, reserves beyond the policy requirement.
2 Berger and Bouwman (2009) show that bank capital is a key determinant for liquidity creation. They also present evidence that liquidity creation varies by bank size. Consistent with these findings, my results show that capital played a significant role in the increased holdings of liquid assets during the financial crisis.
Regarding the role of deposits as a stable source of funds that adds to the accumulation of liquid buffers, I find supporting evidence of a flight-to-quality effect in deposits within the banking sector.
My findings suggest that non-core deposits flew out of banks and returned in the form of core deposits, first to hoarding banks and later to non-hoarding banks. Therefore, I provide evidence of inflows of core deposits at the onset of the crisis to banks that chose to hoard liquidity. During the first year of the crisis, banks highly exposed to securities losses sought to hoard liquid assets as a war chest against future losses. As the crisis deepened during the fall of 2008, exposed banks lost confidence and their core deposits flowed into less exposed banks (non-hoarders of liquidity).
In line with earlier effects of disruptions in interbank markets, my results suggest that the same factors leading to precautionary liquidity hoarding also contributed to the sharp decline in bank lending. I find that for liquidity-hoarding banks, more than one-fourth of the lending contraction is due to the precautionary motive.
The results presented here also have important policy implications. As the recent financial crisis demonstrates, liquidity hoarding affects the normal functioning of short-term funding markets. Due to increased uncertainty and the fear of prolonged restrictions to accessing interbank loans, banks that choose to hoard liquidity may cause a rise in borrowing costs that has an adverse impact on less liquid banks. Moreover, if liquidity-hoarding banks have sufficient market power to manipulate asset prices, some form of predatory behavior may arise. Acharya, Gromb, and Yorulmazer (2008) suggest that liquid banks under-provide liquidity so as to benefit from the fire sale of assets from illiquid banks in desperate need of liquid funds. Hence, liquidity hoarding by banks may constrain the effectiveness of monetary policy that is aimed at restoring the stability of funding markets.
Moreover, the considerable fear associated with the riskiness of banks' portfolios further limits the ability of policy actions to revamp credit growth and stimulate the real economy. Finally, the paper also highlights important differences in the distribution of liquid assets across banks depending on their size. Understanding such differences is crucial in the context of a regulatory reform and must be taken into account in the implementation of capital and liquidity requirements (such as the proposed liquidity coverage ratio and the net stable funding ratio) for banking institutions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the related literature and discusses how my empirical results compare with previous findings. In Section 3, I document the events associated with the disruption in short-term funding markets leading to the hoarding of bank liquidity. I also review the policy tools used to deal with the financial crisis and the way liquidity hoarding manifested itself in the banking sector. Section 4 provides the empirical results for the determinants and the main implications of bank liquidity hoarding. Section 5 concludes.
Related Literature
Several theoretical papers have examined the motivation for banks to hoard liquid assets. For example, banks may decide to hoard liquidity for precautionary reasons if they believe they will be unable to obtain interbank loans when they are affected by temporary liquidity shortages (Allen and Gale, 2004) . Precautionary liquidity hoarding has also been modeled as the response of banks have to collect information on the health of the trading partners of the trading partners of the trading partners, and so on. During times of financial distress, this process becomes extremely costly. Moreover, the confusion and uncertainty that follows a liquidity shock can trigger massive flight-to-quality episodes, and force illiquid banks to withdraw from loan commitments and illiquid positions. As the flight-to-quality unfolds, the financial crisis spreads.
In a similar vein, Zawadowski (2011) uses the idea of financial contagion in network structures to show that uncertainty in short-term funding markets among interconnected institutions can lead to excessive liquidity hoarding. The author shows that, after a liquidity shock, uncertainty about not being able to roll over interbank loans leads to inefficient liquidation of assets, which causes no default in equilibrium but a significant drop in lending. The novelty in his analysis is that uncertainty is capable of spreading and magnifying the impact of liquidity shocks through an interbank network. This network works as an interwoven structure in which each bank finances several other banks, so that uncertainty about funding in one bank spreads to more and more banks in the consecutive layers of intermediation. In the face of fear and uncertainty in financial markets, large institutional investors withdrew their funds from the collective pool of cash by declining to roll over their loan agreements. In normal times, this can be done without causing significant effects on interest rates. However, with deepening concerns about the credit quality of counterparties and the fact that the magnitude of the exposure to subprime-related assets was unknown, investors withdrew their funds en masse.
This withdrawal created a huge shortage of collateral, which forced institutions to sell securities to meet the increased demand for liquidity. As the repo and interbank markets shrunk, the increased sale of securities drove their prices further down. Such deterioration in the value of securities (most of which were being used as collateral in repo transactions) was a natural source of liquidity risk leading to the precautionary hoarding of liquid assets, as shown by an aggregate measure of liquidity (the share of liquid assets to total assets) in the lower panel of Figure 1 . 4 As shown in the next section, although securities losses had a bigger impact on large banking institutions, they were a widespread problem for all banks, and medium and small banks were not immune.
Liquidity Programs and the Federal Reserve response to the crisis
In an effort to ease conditions in interbank and credit markets, the Federal Reserve provided a significant amount of liquidity to the banking sector via several new facilities. (2011) argue, in the context of interest paid on bank reserves and no binding reserve requirements, excess reserves may end up contracting lending. This is the case when interest rates are very low (almost zero) so that the marginal return on loans is smaller than the opportunity cost of making a loan.
The adverse effect on lending is more apparent when banks face increased balance sheet costs associated with agency costs or regulatory requirements for capital or leverage ratios. Using a related argument, Hancock and Passmore (2011) contend that when the cost of capital is high and banks are capital constrained, additional excess reserves impose a tax on the banking sector because they tie up capital for a low profit (or unprofitable) use. As mentioned above, a large accumulation of excess reserves at the central bank after monetary expansions is also found using data for settlement banks in the U.K. and the unsecured euro interbank market. Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF)-were specifically designed to foster the normal functioning of particular financial markets, it is not entirely surprising that the increase in securities holdings by commercial banks is explained by the liquidity provision of these specific programs. Indeed, the observed expansion of securities holdings may reflect the successful propping up of liquidity in specific short-term funding markets.
Commercial Banks' Balance Sheet data
The sharp increase in the holdings of liquid assets contrasts with the evolution of bank loans during these years, especially C&I loans which declined $211 billion. In other words, the aggregate bank balance-sheet information and monetary aggregate figures seem to suggest that the majority of the funds that have been injected into banking organizations did not result directly in additional lending. 7 Instead, banks chose to hoard these liquidity and capital provisions to build up a cushion to protect against further capital losses and expected write-downs. 8 Another manifestation of the liquidity pressures banks faced during the crisis is the large reduction in trading assets and fed funds sold to non-bank institutions (decline in other assets of $449 billion). Liquidity hoarders in this study are defined as banks for which the average ratio of total liquid assets to total assets increased by more than 3 percentage points from a period before the crisis Table 1 presents descriptive statistics (means) for both liquidity hoarders and non-hoarders before and during the financial crisis. Liquidity hoarders reduce their lending much more than nonhoarders during the crisis (loan growth is considerably smaller for liquidity hoarders). On average, the annualized growth rate of loans for liquidity hoarders dropped 5.2 percentage points (from 4.9 percent before the crisis to negative 0.3 percent during the crisis), almost three times the decline in annual growth of their non-hoarding counterparts (2.2 percentage points). Furthermore, liquidity hoarders seem to be slightly larger and better capitalized than their non-hoarding counterparts, both before and during the crisis period. Differences in almost all variables across groups before the crisis and during the crisis are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
Measures of Liquidity Risk
To investigate the causes of liquidity hoarding, I use a regression framework similar to that in Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, and Tehranian (2011). The regression analysis considers the share of liquid assets in total assets as the dependent variable, expressed as changes normalized by total assets. Potential explanatory variables include the log of total assets (a proxy for bank size), the Tier 1 capital ratio, the share of core deposits (the sum of transaction deposits and other insured deposits) in total assets (a proxy for the role of stable sources of funding), and the unused commitment ratio, measured by the share of unused commitments to lending capacity-unused commitments plus assets-(a proxy for off-balance sheet funding liquidity stemming from loans). 
Econometric Results
In contrast to Cornett Columns 5 and 6 indicate that, in general, large unused commitments seem to reduce the holdings of government securities and to increase the holdings of agency MBS. However, they seem to act in the opposite direction during times of financial distress (when the TED spread widens). These results seem counterfactual if one takes the interpretation that large unused commitments are a source of off-balance sheet liquidity risk. As Figure 4 shows, rather than hoarding government securities during the financial crisis, most banks were selling them; and rather than reducing their holdings of agency MBS, most banks decided to continue holding them. In contrast, the securities losses ratio (and more importantly, its interaction with the TED spread) consistently explains the behavior of each category of liquid assets. It significantly explains the increase in cash plus fed funds and the holdings of agency MBS. Securities losses and loan reserves also appear to be significant explanatory variables for the decline in government securities, in agreement with the behavior in 
Liquidity Hoarding and Bank Size
As mentioned above, banks size seems to play a less significant role for liquidity hoarding. To further investigate the role of size, I conducted a regression analysis on each liquid asset category for large banks (assets above $1 billion) and small banks (assets below $1 billion), using the banksize split in Cornett, McNutt, Strahan and Tehranian (2011) . Results are shown in table 3. As before, the interactions between the TED spread and the variables that explain each liquid asset category are of particular interest. Core deposits and capital are more relevant for small banks than for large banks. The negative and significant coefficient on the interaction term of the TED spread and both core deposits and capital suggests that, during times of financial distress, core deposits and capital substitute for cash and fed funds for small banks. However, both funding sources seem to significantly explain the holdings of government securities and MBS during the financial crisis. Table 3 also reveals that the complementarity between unused loan commitments, unrealized losses and loan loss reserves, is significantly important in explaining the cash hoarding of small banks during the financial crisis. However, this evidence seems weaker for large banks. To further examine the relationship between unused commitments and unrealized securities losses, Figure   5 plots the behavior of these two measures of liquidty risk for small and large banks. 
Liquidity Hoarding of Very Large Banks
The results so far suggest that liquidity hoarding occurred across all banking institutions regardless of their size. Both large and small banks were highly exposed to a sudden drawdown in unused commitments, securities losses, and expected loan losses, and had the desire to hoard their cash reserves in anticipation of further write-downs. Moreover, funding risk from unused commitments was the driving force of liquidity hoarding mainly for large banks.
To further investigate the role of the different measures of liquidity risk during the financial crisis, I study the behavior of liquid assets, in particular the holdings of cash and fed funds, for very large banks (the largest 40 banks, with assets above $50 billion). As noted above, the valuation losses were significantly larger for the largest banks after mid-year 2007. These banks accounted for about 85 percent of the $52 billion of total securities losses in the banking sector at the height of the crisis.
Another source of liquidity risk faced by the largest banks during the financial crisis were the liquidity backstops and other forms of liquidity support to their conduits or Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) used in loan securitizations. 15 To account for this type of liquidity risk, I construct the variable Conduit Exposure (as a percent of total assets) by adding two items from Call Reports:
(1) the maximium amount of credit exposure from credit enhancements to conduits (RCFDB806 and RCFDB807), and (2) the unused commitments to provide liquidity to conduits (RCFDB808 15 As documented in Allen and Carletti (2008) , and Brunnermeier (2009), when the market for asset-back commercial paper dried up, collateral values of even the safest (AAA-rated) tranches of securitized products dropped abruptly, forcing banks to either bring the underlying assets back to their balance sheets or to provide the committed support to their conduits. Their need for liquidity then rose dramatically. and RCFDB809). 16 This measure of exposure to conduit structures exists only for the largest banks. I include this measure in the regression equation of the overall liquid asset ratio and the cash and fed funds to assets ratio for the largest banks. Table 4 presents the estimation results. The coefficient of the interaction between the TED spread and the conduit exposure measure is positive and significant. This result suggests a key role of unused backup lines of liquidity that banks provided to their securitization conduits in explaining the cash hoarding of large banks during the financial crisis. Furthermore, Conduit Exposure seems to be another source of off-balance sheet risk which, together with unused loan commitments, exposed banks to liquidity risk stemming from sudden drawdowns from conduit structures and corporations, respectively. Table 4 loan losses, and further liquidity dry-ups. 17 This interpretation is also consistent with Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), who argue that the drawdowns of commited revolving facilities from large corporations in syndicated markets (dominated by large banks) were a "run" on banks instigated by short-term creditors, counterparties, and borrowers who were concened about the liquidity and solvency of the banking sector.
Deposit Growth and Liquidity Hoarding
Previous work has raised concerns on the extent to which banks facing heightened liquidity risk are able to meet the increased borrowing demand from corporations shut out of the commercial The lower panel of Figure 7 shows the growth rate of core and non-core deposits by liquidityhoarding banks and their non-hoarding counterparts. Before the crisis, the growth rates of both core and non-core deposits were lower for liquidity hoarders (red line). This situation reverses during the first year of the financial crisis for core deposits. Deposits increased significantly as liquidity fled other markets and is mainly explained by flows to liquidity-hoarding banks. Non-hoarding banks seemed to attract core deposits at a slower pace. However, as the crisis deepened during the fall of 2008, liquidity hoarders saw a sharp contraction in their core deposits, whereas nonhoarding banks continued to receive such deposits. One interpretation for such different behavior between liquidity hoarders and non-hoarders is that banks highly exposed to credit and securities losses managed to attract deposits at the beginning of the crisis (during the first year) by raising their deposit rates. This interpretation is consistent with Acharya and Mora (2011), who find that banks hit by a funding squeeze attempted to attract deposits by raising their deposit rates. At the height of the crisis, however, depositors lost confidence and these banks were perceived as more risky institutions as some of their losses started to materialize. Less exposed banks (non-hoarders of liquidity) faced lower risks and managed to continue receiving core deposits. In contrast to the surge in core deposits, non-core deposits decreased sharply for both hoarders and non-hoarders at about the same pace.
Taken together, these findings suggest a flight-to-quality effect from non-core to core deposits.
Non-core deposits flew out of both types of banks at similar rates, and returned in the form of core deposits to liquidity hoarders at first, and to non-hoarders at the peak of the crisis. More importantly, this flight-to-quality seems to have occurred within the banking sector, and, therefore, complements the flight-to-quality effect documented by Gatev and Strahan (2006) .
To summarize, during the recent financial turmoil many banking institutions had enormous difficulties accessing short-term debt markets. In those circumstances, it is also likely that within the banking sector-where institutions are more harshly competing for liquid funds-banks perceived as a safe haven for deposits (with large holdings of liquid assets) benefited more than less liquid banks and were able to attract inflows in the form of core deposits by raising their rates. As Pennacchi (2006) suggests, investors regard banks as a "safe haven" only when they can be confident that their deposits are insured or backed by a government guarantee. My findings suggest that core (insured) deposits added liquidity to banks that wanted to hoard their liquid funds.
Determinants of the Decision to Hoard Liquid Assets
Since I can identify the quarter when a bank switches from not hoarding to hoarding liquidity, I investigate the determinants of the decision to hoard liquid assets. This is done using a CoxProportional Hazard Model, which better captures the dynamics in the decision to start hoarding liquidity. 19 In this framework, the dependent variable is a binary variable intended to measure the probability that a bank decides to start hoarding liquid assets at time t, conditional on the fact that it did not hoard liquidity as of t − 1.
The bank's decision to start hoarding liquid assets is modeled as a function of its own characteristics, such as size, capitalization, and availability of deposits. These variables are measured at the beginning of each period (previous quarter). I also include quarter fixed effects to capture time-varying characteristics affecting all banks equally. As before, the main variables of interest are the measures of risk: unused commitments, loan loss reserves as a proxy for future losses in bank loan portfolios, and exposure to losses in securities portfolios. Table 5 presents the estimation results using the same specifications but for two models. In model 1, the dummy variable identifying a bank that starts hoarding liquidity is based on the share of cash and fed funds (including reverse repos) to total assets. In model 2 this variable is measured based on the overall ratio of liquid assets to total assets. Both bank size and bank capital are significant and negatively correlated with the decision to start hoarding liquid assets, which suggests that smaller and less capitalized banks become liquidity hoarders sooner than large and more capitalized banks. Even after controlling for those time-varying bank-specific characteristics, I find strong and significant coefficients on my proposed proxies for on balance sheet risks (i.e. securities losses and loan loss reserves) in model 1, in which liquidity hoarding banks are identified by increased cash and fed fund hondings. The evidence for securities losses as a measure of liqudity risk is weak in model 2, in which liqudity hoarding banks are identified by an increase in the overall liquid asset ratio. A potential explanation for this result is that liquid assets that exclude securities, that is, only excess reserves in the form of cash, fed funds and reverse repos, are used by banks for the purpose of liquidity hoarding. As shown in Figure 4 , during the financial crisis banks increased their holdings of agency MBS but also had to sell government securties to cope with increasing funding pressures.
The estimates are consistent with my hypothesis that banks hoard cash in response to future expected losses and write-downs. Moreover, unlike off-balance sheet liquidity risk stemming from potential drawdowns of committed loans, my proposed measures of on-balance sheet liquidity risks seem to explain more accurately the decision to hoard liquid assets. The coefficient on unused commitments is significant but negative.
Effect of Liquidity Hoarding on Bank Lending
After establishing the result that banks hoard liquidity in response to increased risks in their asset portfolios, particularly during times of financial stress in short-term funding markets (when the TED spread widens), I next test the effects of liquidity hoarding on bank loan growth. I use the following regression specification for the quarterly growth rate of bank loans:
In this specification, economic growth ∆%GDP is included to control for changes in loan demand, and the fraction of net charge-offs to total assets CHG is a measure of credit quality. 20 Liquid is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for banks identified as liquidity hoarders and 0 otherwise.
As expected, when a bank hoards liquidity it has fewer funds available to lend, and therefore, the coefficient on Liquid should be negative, (λ < 0). The effect of changes in the T ED spread interacted with Liquid is also of particular interest. If the T ED spread is an accurate description of the severe stress in interbank and other short-term funding markets, and it causes more liquidity hoarding through the effects on expected losses in banks' asset portfolios, then one would expect a negative impact on lending for banks that hoard liquidity (β s < 0).
The decision to hoard liquid assets is, of course, endogenous. For example, a bank may decide to hoard liquid assets in response to a lack of lending opportunities. Thus, it is possible that the causality runs from less lending to increased holdings of liquid assets. To address endogeneity concerns, and given that I already model the determinants of the decision to hoard liquid assets (using both a probit model and a proportional hazard model), I also run regression (1) replacing the dummy variable Liquid with the predicted values of the decision to hoard liquidity (from a probit model). 21 20 As in Cornet, Mc Nutt, Strahan, and Tehranian (2011), in (unreported) alternative specifications, I find that the sources of liquidity risk (including securities losses) that explain increased holdings of liquid assets also explain the contraction in the loan growth rate during the crisis. I prefer specification (1) as it estimates a loan supply relationship and controls for credit quality and loan demand factors. 21 Another robustness check I consider to deal with endogeneity is a methodology proposed by Faulkender and Peterson (2011) . In this case, regression (1) includes not only the predicted value for the decision to hoard liquidity but also a residual (unexplained) component of liquidity hoarding given by the difference between the actual dummy Liquid and its predicted value. By including these two components, the regression specification controls for the likelihood of being a liquidity hoarder and, conditional on the decision to hoard liquidity, the residual component identifies the effect of liquidity hoarding on loan growth. I obtained similar results using this method.
23
The estimation results using OLS regressions are reported in Table 6. The table shows from the hoarding of liquidity in response to increased risks during financial distress (i.e. due to precautionary reasons), this result suggests an important economic effect: more than one fourth of the reduction in bank lending during the crisis is explained by precautionary liquidity hoarding.
Conclusion
This paper studies the main determinants of bank liquidity hoarding during the recent financial crisis. Consistent with theoretical explanations for the precautionary motive of liquidity hoarding, the empirical results show that banks choose to build up liquidity in anticipation of future expected losses from securities write-downs.
Compared with previously suggested proxies for banks' liquidity risk-such as the proportion of unused loan commitments to their lending capacity-exposure to securities losses in their investment portfolio represents a more accurate measure of liquidity risk associated with the run in repo markets during the financial crisis. This measure of liquidity risk is consistent with the theory of liquidity hoarding reviewed in the paper and provides supporting evidence for the precautionary motive.
I also find evidence that loan loss reserves are another key factor contributing to the increased holdings of liquid assets, especially for small banks. Although not a substitute for cash, and thus less related to liquidity risk, the forward-looking component of loan loss reserves seems to reflect banks' asset reallocation from loans (which have become riskier due to the reduced creditworthiness of their borrowers) to safe and liquid securities.
The paper also documents an important flight-to-quality effect in deposit flows. Consistent with the view that deposits represent a stable source of funds for bank operations, I find evidence of inflows of core deposits during the financial crisis to banks that chose to hoard liquidity. Non-core deposits flew from both liquidity-hoarding and non-hoarding banks, moving into hoarding banks in the form of core deposits. Finally, the paper also finds evidence consistent with previous work documenting the substantial real and financial effects of disruptions in interbank markets. I find that for liquidity-hoarding banks, more than one-fourth of the lending contraction is due to the precautionary motive. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Observ.
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Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
U nused Commit rat Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
Sum of lagged loan growth 0.295***
